Can U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct realtime output gap measures for periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps.
Introduction
Can U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule, where the Federal Reserve increased the interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation? Or is it better described as a series of stop-start policies, where repeated abortive attempts to fight inflation over-stimulated the economy and ultimately produced the Great Inflation?
At first glance, the answer to this question seems obvious, as Federal Reserve policy during the 1970s is not normally thought of as satisfying a stabilizing rule and, in retrospect, certainly produced unfavorable outcomes. Meltzer (2009a) , for example, describes the Federal Reserve during this period as knowing only two speeds: too fast and too slow. Taylor (1999) shows that the actual federal funds rate during the 1970s was considerably below the rate implied by the Taylor rule. The large literature on estimated Taylor rules, notably Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000), finds that the Federal Reserve did not raise the nominal interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation, and thus the Taylor principle was not satisfied, during the 1970s. Orphanides (2003a,b) has forcefully challenged this consensus. His argument is that the output gap used for estimating Taylor rules based on revised data is much smaller than the realtime data known to Federal Reserve officials at the time that policy decisions were made. Using data produced by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), he shows that Federal Reserve policy in the 1970s is consistent with a stabilizing Taylor rule with a 2 percent inflation target.
While Orphanides' argument for the use of real-time data has become virtually universally accepted for Taylor rule estimation, his use of CEA output gaps for this period is controversial. Taylor (2000) argued that the CEA estimates of potential GDP and its growth rate were politicized starting in the late 1960s and that serious economic analysts paid no attention to them. Cecchetti et al (2007) propose an alternative real-time output gap measure, the percentage deviation of GDP from its trend, computed by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using only data available at the time. Their HP filtered output gaps are smaller than Orphanides' output gaps throughout the 1970s and are close to current Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates with revised data. Levin and Taylor (2009) use the same measure.
The question of whether the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule in the 1970s is not simply a matter of whether revised or real-time data is used. Using real-time HP filtered output gaps, we calculate the federal funds rate implied by a stabilizing Taylor rule with a 2 percent inflation target. The implied policy rate is closer to the rate calculated using revised CBO data than real-time CEA data. It is consistently higher than the actual rate, supporting the view that We use real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment to evaluate the four realtime output gap measures. Focusing on 1975:2, the quarter of peak unemployment, we show that the real-time Okun's law output gap approximation is smaller than the CEA estimated output gap, but larger than the HP detrended output gap. The output gaps constructed using real-time linear and quadratic detrending are much closer to the real-time Okun's law approximation than either the CEA or the HP filtered measures. The same picture emerges from considering 1971:4, the quarter of peak unemployment following the recession of 1969-1970, although the evidence for the real-time measure of the natural rate of unemployment is not as comprehensive.
We proceed to estimate Taylor rules for the late 1960s and 1970s, using real-time inflation and four real-time measures of the output gap: linear detrended, quadratic detrended, HP detrended, and CEA, as well as within-quarter CEA output gap forecasts. 1 With all four output gap measures, the coefficient on the four-quarter average inflation rate is below one, so that monetary policy did not follow a stabilizing Taylor rule. Using one to four-quarter inflation forecasts, the coefficient is both above and significantly different from one for some specifications. This does not, however, provide evidence that the Federal Reserve followed a 
Taylor Rules with Real-Time Data for the 1970s
Following Taylor (1993) , the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified as 2 Kozicki and Tinsley (2009) estimate time-varying parameter models with real-time inflation forecasts and unemployment gap estimates. The estimated response to inflation falls below unity in the mid-1970s.
(1) Conditions Digest. Since the data are published with a one-quarter lag, real-time inflation for quarter t is defined as the log change ending in quarter t -1 and the real-time output gap for quarter t as the log difference between real and potential output in quarter t -1, in percent. 5 It is 3 Woodford (2003) generalizes the Taylor principle and shows that determinacy of equilibrium can occur with λ < 1 if γ is sufficiently large. This generalization, however, requires a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve. 4 When Taylor rules are estimated, rather than used for policy evaluation, it is standard practice to allow for partial adjustment of the interest rate to its target. We incorporate partial adjustment in the context of estimation below. 5 Orphanides (2000) provides more information about how the data were constructed. Orphanides (2003b Orphanides ( , 2004 uses CEA real-time output gap data based on within-quarter forecasts, which differs slightly from the data used in these papers (and from each other). We use the one-quarter-lagged data for comparability with other methods for constructing real-time output gaps.
immediately apparent from Figure 1 that the difference between revised and real-time data is substantial, with by far the largest difference at the trough of the recession in 1975. 6 The implications for using Orphanides' real-time output gap measure, rather than a revised output gap measure, are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . Taylor (1980) , followed by quadratic detrending. 9 In order to see how HP filtering compares with these methods, we estimate real-time linear and quadratic detrended output gaps using the same data as for the HP detrended output gaps described above.
Real-time detrended output gaps, as well as CBO revised gaps and CEA real-time gaps for reference, are depicted in Figure quadratic detrended output gaps is lower than the rate implied with revised data, it is generally higher than the actual federal funds rate. Most importantly, the federal funds rate that the Federal
Reserve would have set if it followed a Taylor rule with real-time linear or quadratic detrended output gaps was higher than the actual federal funds rate during the periods following the recessions of 1969-1970 and 1974-1975 . Although the implied federal funds rate with real-time linear or quadratic detrended output gaps is lower than the implied rate with real-time HP detrended data, the conclusion that monetary policy was too stimulative and contributed to the Great Inflation is the same.
Real-Time Output Gaps for the 1970s
Using different measures of real-time output gaps, we have shown that you can reach completely different conclusions regarding whether or not the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule during the 1970s. With CEA output gaps, the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule but failed to prevent the Great Inflation. With real-time HP filtered output gaps, the federal funds rate implied by a Taylor rule was about the same as with revised CBO data, and monetary policy 9 Taylor (1980) performed linear detrending using revised data.
was clearly too stimulative. With real-time linear and quadratic detrended output gaps, the implied federal funds rate was lower than with revised CBO data, but policy was still too stimulative.
Real-Time Okun's Law Output Gaps
Which output gap measure best approximates the perceptions of policymakers in the 1970s? While one cannot hope for a definitive answer, we propose the following metric. One of the best-known rules of economics is Okun's Law, which states that the output gap equals a The official value of the full employment unemployment rate was set at 4.0 percent in the 1962 Economic Report of the President. This value was based on evidence that actual GNP in mid-1955, when the unemployment rate was close to 4.0 percent, was equal to potential output. 10 While the official value remained unchanged until the 1977 Report, when it was raised to 4.9 percent with a natural rate interpretation, the 4.0 percent number is a misleading representation of real-time beliefs in the 1970s. As emphasized by Taylor (2000) , the text of the 1977 Report makes it clear that the CEA staff did not believe the 4.9 percent number. After describing how the CEA "has estimated that the full-employment unemployment rate equivalent to 4.0 percent in 1955 is now 4.9 percent," the text almost immediately goes on to say that there are other factors that were not considered and that "it is likely that they have raised the full-employment unemployment rate even higher than the current estimate, perhaps closer to 5 ½ percent." Later in the same chapter, it is suggested that policy makers "should watch closely for signs of accelerating wage inflation when the overall rate of unemployment falls to about 5 ½ percent." 11 The complications involved in estimating real-time natural rates of unemployment can be illustrated by using the most straightforward method to estimate the natural rate, calculating the average of past unemployment rates. 12 
Research on the Natural Rate of Unemployment in the 1970s
Starting in the late 1960s and continuing through the mid-1970s, a considerable amount of high-profile research showed that 4.0 percent was not a realistic number for either the full- Hall (1999) discusses the advantages of this approach.
unemployment was in the 4 -5 percent range. The report used the term "normal level of unemployment" in exactly the same way that "natural rate of unemployment" would be used today, as the unemployment rate below which inflation would accelerate. 13 The year 1970 marked the initial publication of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), which quickly became a journal widely read by both academics and policy makers.
During the 1970s, BPEA published numerous articles on inflation, unemployment, and Phillips curves, both from a natural rate and a non-natural rate perspective. Hall (1970) He introduced the concept of a weighted unemployment rate, which adjusts the official unemployment rate for the differences in the contributions individuals make to production when they are employed, and argues that the same unemployment rate was associated with a much tighter labor market in 1970 than in the mid-1950s. His calculations, which explicitly reject the accelerationist hypothesis, show that a 3.8 percent unemployment rate was consistent with 3.0 percent inflation in the mid-1950s. By 1970, the unemployment rate consistent with 3.0 percent inflation had risen to over 5.0 percent. 
Calculating Real-time Output Gaps from Real-time Natural Rates of Unemployment
We can now answer the question posed at the beginning of Section 3. 14 Gordon (1977) is the only paper we cite that was not published in Brookings Papers. It was originally presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy in April 1974, but did not contain estimates of the natural rate of unemployment. The revised version with these estimates was circulated as a working paper in September 1976. 15 
Estimated Taylor Rules for the 1970s
For the purpose of estimation, it has become common practice to specify a variant of the Taylor rule which allows for the possibility that the interest rate adjusts gradually to achieve its target level. Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we assume that the actual observable interest rate i t partially adjusts to the target as follows: Table 1 depicts estimates of Equation (4) nominal interest rate when inflation increased, the increase was not sufficient to satisfy the Taylor principle and the policy was not stabilizing. 19 The coefficient on the output gap is 0.70 (linear) and 0.96 (quadratic), both higher than Taylor's postulated 0.50 coefficient. The combination of the coefficient on inflation below one and the coefficient on the output gap above one-half is consistent with the visual evidence that the actual federal funds rate was consistently below the implied Taylor rule rate. The coefficients on the lagged interest rate, 0.42 (linear) and 0.62 (quadratic), indicate a fairly low degree of interest rate smoothing. 18 We do not estimate models using the CBO output gaps because they are not real-time measures that could have been used by policymakers. 19 Both coefficients are significantly greater than zero, but neither is significantly different from one. It is therefore possible that the actual coefficient is greater than one even though the estimated coefficient is less than one.
Estimated Taylor Rules
While the inflation target and equilibrium real interest rate cannot both be identified from estimates of the constant * * φπ µ − = r , it seems reasonable to assume that, during this period, the equilibrium real interest rate was more stable than the inflation target. An implied inflation target can be identified from estimates of µ and the inflation coefficient
by assuming a value of 2.0 percent for the equilibrium real interest rate. This procedure, however, is only valid if the estimate of the inflation coefficient λ in Equation (4) is significantly greater than one, which requires that the estimate of φ in Equation (1) Estimates with the CEA and HP detrended output gaps are also presented in Table 1 Table 1 also reports estimates of Equation (4) Estimated Taylor rules with one-quarter inflation forecasts are reported in Table 1 Estimation results for two, three, and four quarter inflation forecasts are reported in Table   2 , for which the inflation data is consecutively available starting in 1968:4, 1973:3, and 1974:2, respectively. Figure 4 depicts the actual inflation rates and the one-to-four quarter inflation forecasts. 22 The two and three quarter forecasts are annualized two and three quarter averages.
With the linear output gaps, the inflation coefficients are 1.61 (two-quarter forecast), 1.63 (threequarter forecast), and 1.55 (four-quarter forecast), with the two and three-quarter inflation forecast coefficients significantly different from unity. The implied inflation targets are 3.70
(two-quarter forecast) and 3.33 (three-quarter forecast). The inflation forecast coefficients for the quadratic, CEA, and CEA-forecast output gaps are stabilizing but not significantly different from one, resulting in the inflation target not being well-defined. 23 The coefficients for the HP gaps are either not stabilizing (two-quarter) or unreasonably large (three and four-quarter), and are never significantly different from one.
The results with inflation forecasts are different than with inflation rates in several respects. For the linear output gaps, the inflation coefficients are stabilizing and mostly significantly different from unity. For the quadratic, CEA, and CEA-forecast output gaps, the inflation coefficients are also stabilizing, although usually not significantly different from one.
For the HP output gaps, while the inflation forecast coefficients are much larger than the inflation rate coefficients, they are never stabilizing. Some intuition for these results can be found in Figure 4 , which depicts inflation rates and one-to-four quarter inflation forecasts for 1966:1 -1979:2. The inflation forecasts are consistently lower than the inflation rates during 1969 -1972 and 1974 -1976 , periods that span the two recessions of the 1970s. With inflation forecasts lower than inflation rates, the inflation forecast coefficients need to be larger in order to produce the same changes in the federal funds rate. 22 As illustrated in Figure 4 and described in the notes to Table 2 , there are varying numbers on non-consecutive observations and, in one case, a missing observation. We follow Orphanides (2004) and use all available data for the estimation. 23 The only exception is the two-quarter inflation forecast with CEA-forecast output gaps. In that case, the constant is greater than 2.0, making the implied inflation target negative.
Do these results provide evidence that the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor For the linear and quadratic output gaps, the measures which are in accord with the real-time output gaps implied by Okun's Law, the output gap coefficients are larger than those postulated by the Taylor rule, contributing to the conclusion that Federal Reserve policy was too stimulative. The result that Federal Reserve policy followed the Taylor rule with regard to output gaps holds only with the CEA gaps, and is clearly a construct of the CEA gaps being too large.
For the HP output gaps, the coefficients are clearly too large, consistent with the evidence presented above that the gaps are too small.
Stop-Start Monetary Policy
It is often postulated that the Federal Reserve followed a stop-start monetary policy in the 1970s, producing cycles of rising inflation, higher interest rates, and recession, followed by lower interest rates before inflation could be brought down to acceptable levels. 24 Levin and
Taylor (2009) Estimates of Equation (6) with four-quarter average real-time inflation rates and onequarter-ahead inflation forecasts, which are available for both the 1966:1 -1979:2 and the 1969:1-1979:2 samples, are reported in Table 3 . Since an inflation target cannot be identified unless the coefficient φ in Equation (5) is greater than zero, we only report changes in the inflation target if the estimate of the inflation coefficient λ is significantly different from one and at least one of the coefficients on the dummy variables ω in Equation (6) Table 4 reports estimates with two, three, and four-quarter-ahead inflation forecasts. (HP). 25 Our results do not support Levin and Taylor's conclusion that the Federal Reserve stabilized inflation around an increasing target. 26 When inflation rates are used, we do not find any specification for which the coefficient λ on the inflation rate is significantly greater than unity, and so we cannot identify an inflation target, much less changes in the target. When inflation forecasts are used, λ is significantly different from unity and the coefficients on the dummy variables starting in 1970:2 and 1976:1 are significantly different from zero for most specifications. The Federal Reserve raised the nominal interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation forecasts, but not with inflation rates, which does not constitute evidence of inflation stabilization when the forecasts were systematically lower that the actual (or realized)
rates for the crucial periods during or following recessions.
Conclusions
Using graphical, narrative, and econometric analysis, this paper demonstrates that the Federal Reserve did not follow a stabilizing Taylor rule in the 1970s. We first show it is not correct to assert that monetary policy can be characterized by a Taylor rule if real-time, rather than revised, data is used. Instead, the answer to whether the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule in the 1970s depends on which real-time output gap measure is chosen. While, with the CEA output gaps used by Orphanides, the actual path of the federal funds rate is well-described by a rule with Taylor's (1993) original coefficients, the actual rate is consistently below the rate implied by the Taylor rule if for h={-1,1}. π t is inflation, y t is the output gap, and i t is the interest rate. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. CEA t|t-1 denotes real-time CEA output gaps and CEA t|t denotes real-time CEA-forecast output gaps. D1970Q2 and D1976Q1 are dummy variables that equal 1 starting 1970Q2 and 1976Q1, respectively, and 0 otherwise. for h={2,3,4}. π t is inflation, y t is the output gap, and i t is the interest rate. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. CEA t|t-1 denotes real-time CEA output gaps and CEA t|t denotes real-time CEA-forecast output gaps. D1970Q2 and D1976Q1 are dummy variables that equal 1 starting 1970Q2 and 1976Q1, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
